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NOTES
THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE: PREVENTING
THE CHALLENGE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN 767
THIRD AVENUE ASSOCIATES V. CONSULATE GENERAL
OF SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
ChristopherR. Chase'
Deriving from the doctrine of separation of powers,' the political

question doctrine prevents courts from adjudicating issues that are
constitutionally committed to the "political branches ' 2 of the federal
government.' The political question doctrine4 limits judicial power by

curtailing the ability of courts to adjudicate issues best left to the
J.D. Candidate, May 2002, The Catholic University of Amercia, Columbus School of
Law.
1. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) ("The non-justiciability of a political
question is primarily a function of separation of powers."). The judicial resolution of a
controversy depends on whether the Constitution has committed the issue to the Judicial
Branch rather than to another branch. See 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 265
(1998).
2. See Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (stating that the conduct
of foreign relations is committed to the Executive and Legislative Branches, considered to
be "the political departments of the government").
3. See Japan Whaling Assoc. v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986)
(noting that this doctrine excludes from review "those controversies which revolve around
policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the
halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch"). See also United States v.
Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1538 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (noting that the political question
doctrine "precludes courts from resolving issues more properly committed to the political
branches").
4. Some scholars have doubted that such a thing exists, rather believing there are
other legal rules that require dismissal of a claim for lack of jurisdiction instead of the
"political question." See Michael E. Tigar, Judicial Power, The "Political Question
Doctrine," and Foreign Relations, 17 UCLA L. REv. 1135 (1970) (arguing "that there is,
properly speaking, no such thing" as a political question doctrine); Louis Henkin, Is There
a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 599 (1976) (arguing that the
"doctrine" is not necessary since it is underneath the general question of justiciability).
Additionally, Professor Thomas Franck believes that judicial adherence to the political
question doctrine is wrong because the doctrine "is not only not required by but wholly
incompatible with American constitutional theory." THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL
QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL

ANSWERS:

DOES THE RULE

AFFAIRS? 4-5 (1992).
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discretion of Congress or the Executive Branch. 5 Political questions

often arise in the area of foreign relations.' One such discretionary
foreign policy issue constitutionally committed to the Executive Branch
is the issue of foreign state succession. 7
Courts have determined that the recognition of a new foreign state or
nation is not a proper subject for judicial review.' Rather, recognition of
a successor state is a discretionary function reserved for the Executive
Branch. 9 Article II of the Constitution expressly grants the President the
exclusive authority to recognize a foreign government.1 ° Because the
5. See DAVID BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 702 (3d ed. 1996).

6. See Barclay's Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298, 328-29 (1994)
(explaining that the courts have no constitutional authority to make the policy judgments
necessary to conduct foreign relations); see also Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 230
(acknowledging that the courts are generally not equipped to make national policy).
7. Can v. United States, 14 F.3d 160, 163 (1994) (explaining that foreign state
recognition is committed by the Constitution to the Executive Branch). Foreign State
succession is a recognition issue, in which the President has the "exclusive authority to
recognize or not to recognize a foreign state or government." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 204 (1987). The President alone
has the power of recognition. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
410-11 (1964).

See also Geoffrey R. Watson, The Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995, 45

U. L. REV. 837, 846 (1996) (stating that "it is true.., that the President holds the
power to recognize foreign states and governments").
8. Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420 (1839) (establishing that
the Executive Branch determines the sovereignty of a foreign nation, and it is not for the
court to determine whether it is right or wrong).
9. See Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 230 (discussing statutes that implicate foreign
relations and recognizing the important role that the Executive Branch, as well as
Congress, play in the field of foreign relations); Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212
(1890) (noting that recognition of a foreign sovereign is a political question for the
Executive and not the Judiciary to decide); Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 420
(determining that recognition of a foreign sovereign is a political question for the
Executive and not the Judiciary to decide); see also JOHN NOWAK & RONALD ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6.2 (4th ed. 1991) ("Traditionally the President has been
considered responsible for conducting the United States' foreign affairs."). Additionally,
one scholar notes that by replacing the Articles of Confederation with the Constitution,
the Framers intended a strong Executive with broad and effective foreign relations power.
See Jonathan 1. Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 98, 99 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1990).
CATH.

10. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2-3.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 204 cmt. a (1987) (commenting on the

express power of appointing and receiving ambassadors given to the President in Article
11, sections 2 and 3). The President's receiving of an ambassador grants recognition of that
foreign government. See Watson, supra note 7, at 846 (determining that because "the
Constitution vests the President with 'executive power' to receive ambassadors... he holds
the power to recognize foreign states and governments"). This executive authority also
has been created by extra-constitutional means. See Can, 14 F.3d at 163 (interpreting
sections two and three of Article II of the Constitution as granting complete authority to
the President to recognize a foreign state and to control diplomatic relations); United
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issue is considered constitutionally committed to the Executive Branch,"
the Judiciary has determined that issues raising questions of foreign state
succession are political questions,' 2 thereby preventing any form or type
of adjudication. 3 Effectively, the political question doctrine prevents the
Judiciary from reviewing controversies that circle around policy or value
considerations of the Executive Branch of the government, 4 including
the recognition of successor states. 15
Deferring the issue of foreign state succession to the Executive
Branch, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently
decided in 767 Third Avenue Associates v. Consulate General of Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia'6 that determining the liability of the
former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and its
successor states' 7 was an issue for the Executive rather than the Judicial

States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936) (assigning the President
a number of powers not specified in the Constitution). Moreover, the Sabbatino Court
stressed that "[p]olitical recognition [of foreign states] is exclusively a function of the
Executive." Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 410. However, Congress plays some role in
recognition policy. See generally Watson, supra note 7, at 837 (discussing Congress'
decision to move the U.S. embassy in Israel to Jerusalem).
11. See Can, 14 F.3d at 162 (holding that foreign sovereignty is for the Executive to
decide); see infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text (showing that the six factors
established in Baker v. Carr should be used to determine whether a political question
arises in the foreign relations area). An early Senate Foreign Relations Committee
recognized the President as the constitutional representative regarding foreign relations.
See 8 U.S. Sen. Rep. 24 (Feb. 15, 1816) ("The President is the constitutional representative
of the United States with regard to foreign relations."), cited in Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. at 220-21.
12. See Can, 14 F.3d at 165 (recognizing that resolving state succession issues are
political questions that can only be accomplished by the Executive Branch). Accordingly,
the recognition of foreign governments is primarily a function of the Executive Branch
and the Judiciary typically follows the Executive regarding sovereignty issues. Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 212 (1962) (recognizing that the Judiciary typically follows the
Executive's opinion regarding foreign affairs issues).
13. See, e.g., Can, 14 F.3d at 163 (declaring that the issue of state succession is
constitutionally committed to the Executive rather than the Judiciary). See also Oetjen v.
Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918) (determining not to adjudicate a claim involving
the proper succession of Mexico).
14. See Japan Whaling Assoc. v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986)
(clarifying, however, that although the judiciary does not hear political questions, not
every matter referring to politics is a political question).
15. See Can, 14 F.3d at 163 ("The recognition of any rights of succession to a foreign
sovereign's power.., is in the first instance constitutionally committed to the Executive
Branch of the government, not to the judiciary.").
16. 218 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2000).
17. The five successor states to the former SFRY are Slovenia, Croatia, BosniaHerzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY), which is comprised of Serbia and Montenegro. See id. at 155.
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Branch to decide.' 8 Essentially, the court followed the long-standing rule
that if the claim challenges the wisdom of a particular foreign policy - in
this case the recognition of successor states to the former SFRY - rather
than the implementation procedure of that policy or a substantive right
of individuals compromised by the policy, the claim will generally be a
nonjusticiable political question.' 9
The political upheaval and military conflict in the former SFRY
created the issue presented in 767 Third Avenue Associates.2' Following
a civil war that led to the disintegration of the former SFRY and
subsequent formation of five successor states,2' the three SFRY
governmental agencies occupying property in New York City were
expelled from the United States by the George H.W. Bush
Administration.22 Prior to the expulsion however, all three tenants
signed lease extensions with 767 Third Avenue Associates, the property
23
owners,23 which resulted
in the rent falling into arrears. 24 Consequently,
18. See id. at 161 (relying on the precedent of Baker and Can to rule that the issue of
successor state liability is constitutionally committed to the Executive Branch and that
there are no practical standards to resolve this issue of liability).
19. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1996) (permitting plaintiffs to sue
a foreign military leader for war crimes because the action fell under the Alien Tort Claim
Act); Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991) (allowing a suit
that implicated foreign relations because it could be decided under tort law); compare
Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 838 F.2d 649, 650-51 (2d
Cir. 1988) (allowing an action that challenged the implementation of the government's
policy), with Can, 14 F.3d at 165 (rejecting an action that challenged the policy of the
government itself). Recognizing the difference between challenging foreign policy and
bringing a substantive claim, the Southern District of Florida stated that "[t]he distinction
is therefore between justiciable questions of constitutional authority and nonjusticiable
broad challenges to the conduct of foreign policy, the resolution of which threatens to
entangle the court in the management of foreign affairs." United States v. Noriega, 746 F.
Supp. 1506, 1539 (S.D. Fla. 1990). See infra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing
when suits involving foreign relations can be adjudicated).
20. See 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. Consulate Gen. of Socialist Fed. Rep. of
Yugoslavia, 60 F. Supp. 2d 267, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (explaining that the civil war in
Yugoslavia ultimately led the tenants to default on their lease payments).
21. See stpra note 17 (listing the successor states). The United States has recognized
all but the FRY, and formally acknowledged that the SFRY ceased to exist on May 24,
1992. See 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. Consulate Gen. of Socialist Fed. Rep. of Yugoslavia,
218 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2000).
22. 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 60 F. Supp. 2d at 270 (noting that in expressing its
opposition to the conduct of the regime in power, the U.S. government under President
George H.W. Bush forced all SFRY consulate staff in the United States to leave, in
addition to freezing Yugoslav assets in the United States).
23. 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 218 F.3d at 156-57. The Consulate General extended its
lease on October 28, 1991, for five years; the Chamber of Economy extended its lease on
August 5, 1991, for five years; and the Cultural Center lease was extended on October 28,
1991, for three years. Id.
24. Id. at 1.57 (discussing the facts that because the lease extensions were broken, the
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the landlords brought an action in the United States District Court for
District of New York to recover the total rent owed plus
the Southern
2

interest. 5

In what appeared to be a "garden-variety" landlord-tenant dispute,26
the landlords sued the former SFRY and its successor states, alleging that
the states were successors to the SFRY's liabilities. The district court
ruled that the claim presented nonjusticiable political questions because
the Executive Branch had not made a decision regarding the liability of
the former SFRY and its successors.28 Moreover, the court could not
adjudicate the practical problems of allocating liabilities and assets
presented by the claim.29 Consequently, the district court placed the
action on the suspense calendar,"° which would have postponed any

possible adjudicative action until after the Executive Branch made a
policy determination. 3

The landlords appealed the decision of the district court, raising the
question of whether the claims and relief sought are the type that can be
adjudicated.32 Using the precedent established by the Supreme Court to
determine if questions involving foreign relations presented political
questions,3 the Second Circuit rejected the arguments by the landlord
that its claim presented judicially resolvable issues.34 The court
landlords now seek the rent owed on the leases).
25. Id. (explaining the plaintiff's claim that the tenants owe $2,262,224 plus interest).
26. See id. at 155 (insinuating that while this appears to be a simple landlord-tenant
action, the court ultimately needed to decide much more).
27. 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 60 F. Supp. 2d at 269 (explaining that the five successor
states countered the complaint by moving for summary judgment and dismissal).
28. See id. at 275 (holding that a judicial determination would violate separation of
powers principles because the Executive Branch, "which should set national foreign
policy," has not fully assessed the liability of the successor states but rather insists that the
unfinished international negotiation efforts should be the basis for U.S. policy).
29. Id. at 274 (recognizing that it would be problematic for the court to allocate the
SFRY assets and liabilities among the successor states).
30. Id. at 282 (ordering a stay of the case).
31. Id. (reconciling the lack of adjudication of the landlords' claim by placing the case
on the suspense calendar, the court abstained from deciding the issue until the Executive
Branch made a policy determination on the issue).
32. See 767 Third Ave. Assoc., 218 F.3d at 159 (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486, 517 (1969)).
33. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 212 (1962) (looking at the facts of each foreign
relations case determines if it is justiciable or not).
34. See 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 218 F,3d at 159-60 (relying on Supreme Court
precedent). The landlords argued that (1) there was no textual commitment of the
succession issues to the other branches; (2) the Executive Branch had recognized the
successors; (3) application of state law provided judicially manageable standards for relief;
and (4) applying international law would give the same result. See id.
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recognized that the determination of successor state liability for the
former SFRY is properly allocated to the Executive Branch,35 and that a
judicial conclusion regarding the situation could result in a hindrance of
executive foreign policy. 3 6 Unlike the district court, however, the Second

Circuit concluded that when an adjudication of a claim involving a
political question occurs, courts should dismiss the case rather than place
it on the suspense calendar.3 7 Consequently, if the 767 Third Avenue
Associates decision prevails, litigants will not be able to pursue actions
involving foreign policy in the Second Circuit unless they challenge the
policy's implementation procedure 3 or use a claim within a substantive
area of law. 9 Under Second Circuit precedent, the decision not to
adjudicate is a necessary evil that, on one hand, prevents litigants from
challenging the policy of the United States, even if they are wronged, but
on the other hand, protects the Executive Branch's decision-making
power in the area of foreign relations.
This Note examines the political question doctrine regarding foreign
relations, and more specifically, the policy of successor state liability as
applied in 767 Third Avenue Associates. This Note first discusses the
political question doctrine that developed from the principle of
35. See id. at 160 (concluding that constitutional jurisprudence prohibits the Judiciary
from usurping the Executive Branch's role in foreign state recognition). See also Oetjen v.
Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 298, 302 (1918) (holding that the conduct of foreign relations
is committed to the other two branches); Can v. United States, 14 F.3d 160, 163 (1995)
(holding that sovereign succession is constitutionally committed to the Executive).
36. See 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 218 F.3d at 160 (agreeing with the government's
amicus brief that the U.S. government is looking towards international forums to resolve
the liability question due to the volatile atmosphere in the area of the former SFRY).
37. See id. at 163-64 (believing that dismissal is more appropriate than the stay
order). The Second Circuit decided that the lower court was incapable of adjudicating the
issue because there was no policy determinant made within a reasonable time, thus
eliminating the reason for the stay order. See id. at 164.
38. See, e.g., Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 827 (2d Cir. 1.991) (challenging the
federal funding to foreign schools under a claim of an Establishment Clause violation);
Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 838 F.2d 649,650 (2d Cir.
1988) (challenging federal funding of foreign medical organizations that approve
abortions).
39. See, e.g., Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991)
(adjudicating a claim under common law torts even though the action involved foreign
affairs); Sage Realty Corp. v. Jugobanka D.D., No. 95 CIV. 0323,1998 WL 702272, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 1998) (deciding a contract issue despite a political question defense
because the court was not required to make any foreign policy determinations).
Recognizing the difference between challenging foreign policy and bringing a substantive
claim, the Southern District of Florida stated that "[t]he distinction is therefore between
justiciable questions of constitutional authority and nonjusticiable broad challenges to the
conduct of foreign policy, the resolution of which threatens to entangle the court in the
management of foreign affairs." United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp, 1506, 1539 (S.D.
Fla. 1990).
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separation of powers, including the allocation of foreign relations
decision-making power to the Executive Branch. Next, this Note
examines the leading cases that developed the political question doctrine,
with a special focus on Second Circuit decisions concerning challenges to
U.S. foreign policy and the implementation of foreign policy. This Note
then scrutinizes the Second Circuit's rationale behind its 767 Third
Avenue Associates decision. Finally, this Note analyzes the significance
of 767 Third Avenue Associates and argues that challenges to U.S.
foreign policy should be dismissed as nonjusticiable political questions to
ensure that the President's inherent role in shaping foreign policy is
protected despite the potential harm to innocent parties.
I. THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE IN THE REALM OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS

The constitutional doctrine that the Judiciary cannot adjudicate
political questions stems from the doctrine of separation of powers.4"
Dispersed among the first three articles of the U.S. Constitution, each
branch of the national government receives authority over certain
areas.4 1 Mainly because of textual commitments in Article II, the
Executive Branch has been identified as having the most control over
foreign relations.42 On the other hand, the precise role of the Judicial
Branch in foreign relations has been muddled,43 as courts generally defer
to the Executive Branch because it is the best equipped to make foreign
policy determinations. 44 The power to recognize foreign state succession
is one area that has been considered within the power of the Executive
Branch rather than the Judiciary.45
40. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (noting the role the
Judiciary plays in the U.S. system of government).
41. See U.S. CONST. arts. I-III (giving law-making power to the Legislative Branch,
law enforcement power to the Executive Branch and adjudicative power to the Judicial
Branch); CHARLES GUNTHER & KATHERINE SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 354
(4th ed. 1999) (noting that the Framers of the Constitution deliberately provided for the
horizontal allotment in order to safeguard against tyranny). Nevertheless, legislative,
executive and judicial powers are often intertwined. See id. at 354. An example of this
overlap is having the "President [participate] in the legislative process through the veto
power." Id.
42. See U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2-3 (allowing the President to make treaties and
appoint and receive ambassadors).
43. See Charney, supra note 9, at 98.
44. See Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (explaining that the
discretion used in exercising the political power of policy determinations "is not subject to
judicial inquiry or decision").
45. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 212 (1962) (commenting that the Executive
Branch recognizes foreign states and the Judiciary may only review the status of a nation
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A. The Development of the PoliticalQuestion Doctrinein Foreign
Relations
Specifically providing for the distribution of national authority among
the three branches of government, the Framers of the Constitution
allocated the Legislative, Executive and Judicial Branches an area of
power.4" As Justice Louis Brandeis noted in Myers v. United States, 47 the
separation of powers doctrine was developed to save the American
people from autocracy by preventing the exercise of arbitrary power by
any single branch.48 For instance, Article III grants the Judiciary the
power to adjudicate and review law, 49 but not to create or enforce the
law that was adjudicated. 50 This general rule upholds the separation
between the three branches by ensuring that the Judiciary does not
encroach upon the legislative or executive tasks of government."
The political question doctrine originated in 1803 in Marbury v.
Madison,52 where Chief Justice John Marshall stated, "questions in their
nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to
the executive [or legislative branch], can never be made in this court."53
The political question doctrine, therefore, is an extension of the
separation of powers because it excludes from judicial review policy
concerns and value determinations textually committed to either of the
two political branches. 4
following a determination by the Executive).
46. See supra note 41 (identifying the areas of power); see also GUNTHER &
SULLIVAN, supra note 41, at 354.
47. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
48. Id. at 293 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting that the purpose of separation of
powers was to create friction amongst the branches to protect against an arbitrary
government).
49. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) ("It is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
50. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I (allocating law-making powers to the Legislative
Branch), and U.S. CONST. art. II (allocating to the Executive law enforcement power),
with U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (allocating to the courts the power of judicial review).
51. See 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 267 (1998) (discussing the
impermissibility of imposition of non-judicial functions upon the Judiciary).
52. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
53. Id. at 170 (declaring the inappropriateness of judicial review of foreign affairs
because it generally constitutes an inherently political question). Nevertheless, Professor
Franck believes that adherence to the doctrine is wrong and should be eliminated because
it rests on "pure dicta" from the Marbury decision. See Franck, supra note 4, at 18.
54. See 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 285 (1998) (noting that cases and
controversies can only be reviewed when consistent with the separation of powers
doctrine); see also Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 213
(1972) ("The doctrine of political questions is constitutionally significant only as an
ordinance of extraordinary judicial abstentation ....). Significantly, the courts will not
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The establishment and administration of foreign policy is considered
an area that is political rather than judicial in nature.5 5 Issues of foreign
relations, such as the recognition of foreign states," are prime examples
of the type of political questions the courts have declined to review."
Traditionally, the administration of foreign relations is considered
constitutionally committed to the Executive Branch within Article II,
which delegates to the President the power to appoint and receive
foreign ambassadors.58 Chief Justice John Marshall first noted in 1800
that "[t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in its external
relations."59 Since 1800, in a series of decisions, the Supreme Court has
recognized the important role the Executive plays in the field of foreign
relations,6" including the inherent authority to recognize the legitimacy of
foreign sovereigns and state succession. 6' Although foreign relations is
adjudicate issues that are primarily political rather than judicial in nature. See, e.g. U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2 (directing that judicial power extends only to cases and controversies);
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (holding that the Senate has sole discretion
from the Constitution to choose impeachment procedures); Chiles v. United States, 69
F.3d 1094 (11th Cir. 1995) (refusing to adjudicate whether a state's right to a republican
form of government had been violated); see also 16 AM. JUR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 285
(1998) (discussing the "fundamental characteristics of non-justiciable political questions").
55. See HENKIN, supra note 54, at 205 (noting that foreign relations are political
relations, but these issues do occasionally enter court).
56. See Can v. United States, 14 F.3d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 1994) (determining that the
recognition of the former Vietnam was a political question).
57. See HENKIN, supra note 54, at 210 (recognizing the political question as an
additional obstacle for the review of foreign relations).
58. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2-3. Article II states, in pertinent part, that the President
"shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
ambassadors...; [H]e shall receive Ambassadors...." Id. See also United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (interpreting Article II, the
Supreme Court stated that "[T]he President alone has the power to speak or listen as a
representative of the nation...."); Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918)
("The conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the
Constitution to the Executive... Departments of the Government, and the propriety of
what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or
decision."); see also Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228 (identifying the concern that once the Judiciary
determines whether and to what extent the issue is textually committed, it can make a
decision upon the issue).
59. 6 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 613-14 (1800) (statement of John Marshall) (noting that
the President is the "sole representative" of the United States with foreign nations).
60. See Curtiss-WrightExport Corp., 299 U.S. at 319 ("[T]he President alone has the
").
power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation ....
61. See Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890) (noting that recognition of a
foreign sovereign is a political question for the Executive and not the Judiciary to decide);
Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420 (1839) (noting that recognition of a
foreign sovereign is a political question for the Executive and not the Judiciary to decide);
see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 9, § 6.2 ("Traditionally the President has been
considered responsible for conducting the United States' foreign affairs.").
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considered the natural territory of the Executive Branch the Court has
declared that "it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which
touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance."63 The
Judiciary receives power under Article III to review foreign relations by
allowing the courts to adjudicate cases that involve ambassadors, foreign
states and citizens, and consuls.6
Additionally, the courts are
empowered to construe the constitutionality of treaties and executive

agreements, 65 as well as interpret legislation that involves foreign
affairs.6 However, the courts balk at employing any authority in the
area of foreign relations that would overstep the boundaries of Article
111.67

The courts are also less willing to curb the discretion of the political

branches because the courts lack the institutional expertise and resources
necessary to conduct foreign affairs.6 Therefore, before the Judiciary
will involve itself in a foreign relations matter, it will focus on the
particular area of foreign relations to determine if there is a textual

commitment in the Constitution or a prudential allocation concern that
requires a court to defer to another branch.69
B. Baker v. Carr: Defining a PoliticalQuestion

The quintessential restatement of the political question doctrine is
contained in Baker v. Carr.7" In Baker, the Supreme Court rejected the
argument that lawsuits challenging the apportionment plan of the
62. See Jack Garvey, Judicial ForeignPolicy-Making in InternationalCivil Litigation:
Endingthe Charadeof Separationof Powers, 24 LAW AND POLICY ININT'L Bus. 461, 481
(1993) (explaining that jurisdictional questions between the Executive and Legislative
Branches regarding foreign relations can be decided by the Judicial Branch).
63. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (noting that a broad statement that courts
should never adjudicate cases involving foreign relations is not proper, rather, each issue
should be looked at on a case-by-case basis).
64. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases...
affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and Consuls"). Article III also gives to the
courts the power to adjudicate cases between a U.S. citizen and Foreign States, citizens or
subjects. See id.
65. See Japan Whaling Assoc. v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986)
(acknowledging the holding in Baker that the courts can construe treaties and executive
agreements).
66. See id.
67. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 9, § 6.4 (recognizing a hindrance to the
judicial review power of the court).
68. See HENKIN, supra note 54, at 206 (concluding that judicial power is limited in
cases of foreign affairs).
69. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (discussing that there is no way to catalogue cases that
are political questions, rather the Court must inquire as to the particular facts of each
case).
70. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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Tennessee General Assembly presented a nonjusticiable political
question. 7' Although recognizing that the political question doctrine
serves to protect the separation of powers doctrine,72 the Court
determined that adjudication of the claim was possible because the
political question doctrine does not prevent a court from hearing a case

simply because it involves a political issue.73
In determining that the claim against the Tennessee apportionment
statute was justiciable, Justice William Brennan established a six-part
methodology to distinguish between a political question and a justiciable
claim. 4 According to Justice Brennan, a court should dismiss a claim as
a nonjusticiable political question when the claim involves (1) a textual
commitment to another branch in the Constitution; (2) a lack of judicial
standards for deciding the issue; (3) the impossibility of deciding the
issue without the court making a nonjudicial policy determination; (4)
the impossibility of a judicial resolution of the issue without encroaching
upon another branch's constitutional prerogatives; (5) the obedient
adherence to a previously made political decision; or (6) the potential
chance of multifarious pronouncements by various departments within
the three branches on the same question.7 5
A conflict falling within one or more of these categories is considered
76
inappropriate for resolution by the courts. Derived from Article 111,77
71. See id at 237 (holding that the equal protection claims are valid under the
Fourteenth Amendment where qualified citizens' votes were debased by the then current
apportionment plan of the Tennessee General Assembly).
72. See id. at 210 (establishing a basis for the political question doctrine).
73. Id. at 217; see Japan Whaling Assoc. v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230
(1986) (noting that the Judiciary "cannot shirk [its constitutional] responsibility merely
because [a] decision may have significant political overtones").
74. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (identifying six concerns to determine whether an issue
is a nonjusticiable political question).
75. See id. Justice Brennan articulated that:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality
of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question.
Id See also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 9, at 206 (stating that "[t]he court hesitates
to exercise any authority.., that would exceed the scope [of their] express constitutional

grants").
76. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (holding that any one of these factors will create a political
question).
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the first factor is considered dominant when determining whether the
issue presents a political question."8 The second and third factors suggest
a functional approach to determining a political question because they
each ask if the Judiciary has the ability to make a determination on the
issue presented."9 The final three are all prudential considerations that
are relevant only when a judicial resolution would interfere with
governmental policy interests established by one or both of the political
branches.8"
More importantly, the Baker Court discussed several categories of law
that may invoke the political question doctrine, including foreign
relations.8 The Court noted that "sweeping statements" have been
made that any conflict touching foreign relations is a political question
that is not to be adjudicated by the Judiciary.8" The Court quickly
brushed aside such generalities by declaring that not every case relating
to foreign relations is a political question.83 After analyzing various
77. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS § 14 (4th ed.
1983) (commenting that Article III gives the Judiciary power to review certain cases and
controversies only, thus limiting the Judiciary's textual commitments).
78. See Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting
that the first Baker factor is the most important and dominant of the six); Lamont v.
Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 831-32 (2d Cir. 1991) (trying to uphold the separation of powers
doctrine while noting that the textually demonstrable commitment is the most dominant
factor). See also 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. Consulate Gen. of Socialist Fed. Rep. of
Yugoslavia, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 274 (stating that separation of powers concerns are at the
heart of the first factor).
79. See WRIGHT, supra note 77, § 14 (observing that the functional approach is one of
three theoretical strands). Additionally, the Southern District of New York stated that the
basis of the second and third factors are limitations on judicial competence and the judicial
role. See 767 ThirdAve. Assocs., 60 F. Supp. 2d at 272.
80. See 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 60 F. Supp. 2d. at 272; Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232,
249 (2d Cir. 1996) (using the Baker factors to determine whether a claim against a
particular foreign policy issue would constitute a political question); see also George Sylz,
International Law in National Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 65, 108 (1996) ("The
underlying concern in disputes about whether or not to apply the political question
doctrine is the possible inhibiting effect of judicial rulings on the flexibility of the political
branches in foreign affairs.").
81. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 211-15 (analyzing certain areas that may raise political
questions, such as dates and duration of hostilities, validity of enactments, and the status
of Indian Tribes in addition to the foreign relations area).
82. See id. (citing Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918)). In Oetjen,
rival generals both claimed control of Mexico for themselves. See Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 299300. The former owner of leather hides brought an action against a hide purchasing
company that implicated one of the Mexican generals who claimed to be the de facto
leader of the country, which would have required the Court to make a policy
determination. See id. at 300-01. The Court rejected the claim as nonjusticiable because
the conduct of foreign relations is constitutionally committed to the political branches and
is not subject to judicial inquiry. Id. at 302.
83. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211; see also Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249 (stating that the court should
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foreign relations scenarios,8 4 the Baker Court pointed out that before the
Judiciary may act in a foreign relations matter, the Executive Branch
must make the initial policy determination." Following the executive
action, a court may examine the underlying statute or treaty at issue to
determine whether it is constitutional.86 Consequently, a court must
analyze the relevant factors of a foreign relations issue on a case-by-case
basis to ascertain whether the court should utilize the political question
doctrine."7
Following Baker, the Supreme Court made it clear that the Judiciary is
the branch that determines whether a nonjusticiable political question
exists. Justice Brennan noted in his dissent to FirstNational City Bank
v. Banco National de Cuba,89 that "[t]he Executive Branch... cannot by
simple stipulation change a political question into a cognizable claim." 0
Although the views of the Executive Branch are generally considered in
determining the justiciability of a claim, those views are not necessarily
persuasive.9 Even in.cases of state succession, in which state recognition
is exclusively the function of the Executive Branch,92 the court remains
not brush aside difficult decisions in the name of the political question doctrine).
84. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 212 (discussing the examples of questionable foreign
sovereignty, recognition of belligerency, and diplomatic status - all of which the Executive
must make the initial policy decision).
85. See id. at 212 (recognizing that once sovereignty over an area is declared, the
courts may examine the resulting status).
86. See id. (allowing a court to review foreign affairs legislation); see also Terlinden v.
Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902) (construing a "purely political" treaty as being asserted by the
government).
87. Id. at 211 (declaring that a court must ultimately make the decision of whether a
case presents a nonjusticiable political question based on the facts); Attorney Gen. of
Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 134, 137 (N.D.N.Y.
2000). In Attorney General of Canada, the Northern District of New York determined
that foreign policy was only tangentially affected, after utilizing the six Baker factors to
overcome the political question doctrine. Id. at 145-46.
88. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 762-70 (1972); see
also 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. Consulate Gen. of Fed. Rep. of Yugoslavia, 60 F. Supp. 2d
267, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that the opinion of the Executive Branch is informative,
but not binding).
89. 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
90. Id. at 788 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 250 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that the Executive
Branch's assertion is respected, but does not preclude adjudication); Jugobank A.D.
Belgrade v. Sidex Int'l Furniture Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 407, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (declaring
that although "the views of the Executive Branch often will have an important bearing on
a court's determination... they are not conclusive").
92. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410-11 (1964) (noting
that judicial recognition of a foreign state may not be incongruent with the Executive
Branch's function when only diplomatic relations are broken).
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the ultimate adjudicator of the issue presented. 93
C. Presentinga PoliticalQuestion: The Distinction Between Foreign
Policy and Implementation

In foreign relations cases, a distinguishing characteristic of justiciable
claims in which courts reject political question attacks is that the claims
generally do not challenge a particular foreign policy position but rather
involve a substantive area of the law or the implementation procedure of
foreign policy. 9' The courts are reluctant to adjudicate claims implicating
national foreign policy because of either the separation of powers
96
doctrine,95 or their clear incapacity to handle such complicated matters.

93. See 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 60 F. Supp. 2d at 274. In 767 Third Avenue
Associates, the United States proposed a legal conclusion to the liability of the successor
states in an attempt to avoid a political question challenge, Id The court found the
government's position informative but would not use its theory to adjudicate the issue. Id.
94. See Flynn v. Schultz, 748 F.2d 1186, 1191 (7th Cir. 1984). In Flynn, the court
stated:
As a general rule, requests for relief involving foreign affairs which are not based
on a constitutional right, treaty, congressional directive or established
administrative procedure fall squarely under the category of political questions
outlined in Baker which involve "potential judicial interference with executive
discretion in the foreign affairs field" and which seek to "dictate foreign policy."
Id. (quoting Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 898 (D.D.C. 1982)); see also Can v.
United States, 14 F.3d 160, 162 (2d Cir. 1995) (determining that a claim involving foreign
affairs cannot be adjudicated "on the basis of political theories that incorporate no
statutory, constitutional or common-law basis").
Significantly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held
that attacks on foreign policy-making are nonjusticiable, but "claims alleging noncompliance with the law are justiciable, even though the limited review that the court
undertakes may have an effect on foreign affairs." See DKT Mem'l Fund, Ltd. v. Agency
for Int'l. Dev., 810 F.2d 1236, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing Population Inst. v. McPherson,
797 F.2d 1062, 1068-70 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). In DKT Memorial Fund, domestic and foreign
nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") challenged the lawfulness of the Agency for
International Development's ("AID's") implementation of a governmental policy that
eliminates funding for NGOs that perform, promote or furnish assistance to abortionrelated activities. See id. at 1237. The court concluded that the challenge did not present a
political question since the NGOs "did not seek to litigate the political and social wisdom
of AID's foreign policy," but rather "[t]hey challenge[d] the legality of AID's
implementation of the policy." Id. at 1238.
95. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (emphasizing the textual commitment
to the other branches).
96. See Michael Glennon, Foreign Affairs and the Political Question Doctrine, in
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 107, 108 (Louis Henkin, et
al. eds., 1990) (recognizing that the courts are trying to protect their legitimacy by not
adjudicating cases that they are incapable of); see also Flynn, 748 F.2d at 1193 (hesitating
to resolve the issue at hand because it would "require ascertainment of facts and standards
of decision that are beyond judicial discovery and management"); United States &
Namibia Trade Council v. United States Dep't of State, 90 F.R.D. 695, 698 (D.D.C. 1981)
("Although there are some situations where judicial review is appropriate, these generally
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However, when the rights of individuals or federalism principles are
involved,97 the courts are more likely to review issues of foreign
relations.98 Consequently, whether a political question is presented or
not in a foreign policy matter often depends on the issue before the
court.

99

As the Second Circuit discovered, the distinction between a challenge
of foreign policy and the implementation procedure of foreign policy has
important consequences for the justiciability of an action. 0 0 For
instance, in Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Agency
for InternationalDevelopment,l '' an abortion rights group challenged the
implementation of an anti-abortion policy by the Agency for
International Development ("AID"), an Executive Branch agency.'0 2
involve the interpretation of statutes, executive declarations, etc., rather than the making
of the kind of substantive determinations embodied in executive or congressional action in
the foreign affairs field.").
97. See Charney, supra note 9, at 100 (noting that in cases or controversies such as
these, the courts must adjudicate the issues or else compromise the authority of the federal
courts in maintaining separation of powers).
98. See id.; see, e.g., Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir.
1991) (allowing a suit that implicated foreign relations because it could be decided under
tort law); see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 244, 249 (2d Cir. 1996) (permitting plaintiffs
to sue a foreign military leader for war crimes because the action fell under the Alien Tort
Claims Act).
99. See Ukrainian-American Bar Ass'n, Inc. v. Baker, 893 F.2d 1374, 1380 (D.C. Cir.
1990) ("That a claim implicates important government polices however, does not
necessarily mean that the political question doctrine precludes the judiciary from hearing
it."). See, e.g., Richardson v. Simon, 560 F.3d 500, 502 (2d Cir. 1977) (rejecting a due
process challenge by the executors of a Cuban national's will seeking to unfreeze the
national's assets blocked by the Secretary of the Treasury). In Richardson, the Secretary
of the Treasury blocked the assets of a Cuban national pursuant to federal law. Id. at 502.
Viewing the due process challenge under a rational basis standard, the Second Circuit
rejected the executor's arguments and found that what to do with the blocked funds is a
policy judgment which is "in the first instance for the Executive and Legislative branches."
Id. at 505. Interestingly, the court concluded that "[w]hile there are strong human
arguments in favor" of finding for the executors and releasing the assets, the court
ultimately held "that the final disposition of the interests held by [the Cuban National] at
the time of his death in Cuba must await determination by Congress and the Executive of
the interests of the United States in its relations with Cuba." Id. at 506. Nevertheless, it
has been argued that courts circumvent the political question issues by finding another
way to decide the case. See Franck, supra note 4, at 61 ("This can be done by simply
reclassifying the subject matter of the case; for example, deciding that [the case] deals with
treaty interpretation or a First Amendment claim rather than foreign affairs.").
100. See infra section III (arguing that challenging foreign policy itself, such as foreign
state succession, will be considered a nonjusticiable political question).
101. 838 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1988).
102. See id. at 650. The President delegated his authority to the Director of the U.S.
International Development and Cooperation Agency who in turn delegated its authority
to the AID. Id. at 651.
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The AID policy precluded any federal assistance to foreign organizations
that performed or promoted abortions.'0 3 The Second Circuit rejected
AID's argument that its policy was a nonjusticiable political question." 4
Applying First Amendment jurisprudence to the plaintiffs' freedom of
expression claim, the court reasoned that it was not required to evaluate
the merits of AID's underlying policy of withholding federal funds to
foreign organizations that perform abortions.' °5 Rather, the court could
use legal standards to determine if this policy was a violation of Planned
Parenthood's First Amendment rights. 10 6 Therefore, the Second Circuit
concluded that challenging the constitutionality of an executive action
that implemented U.S. foreign policy through monetary grants did not
present a nonjusticiable political question because the method of
implementation was not itself an expression of foreign policy." 7
The Second Circuit again faced the question of policy versus
implementation in Lamont v. Woods.'l° In Lamont, AID was sued for
violating the establishment clause of the First Amendment'0 9 because the
agency dispersed public funds for the purpose of building and
maintaining religious schools abroad." 1 In addressing the issue of
justiciability, the Second Circuit first determined whether the issue was

103. See id. at 651. The financial support given by the United States comes from the

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 ("FAA"), which authorizes foreign assistance for
voluntary population planning. See id. Although Congress provided the President
discretionary power to administer foreign assistance, the FAA expressly prohibited the
President from granting assistance to foreign organizations that performed abortions. See
id. The President delegated his authority to the Director of AID. See id. The Standard
Clause, which requires certification in writing that international assistance organizations
seeking funds "do[] not perform or actively promote abortion as a method of family
planning," originated from a White House policy statement, which committed the United
States to withhold funding for organizations that perform abortions regardless of whether
or not abortions were financed with federal funds. Id. Planned Parenthood challenged
the Standard Clause contained in the cooperative agreement because, under the FAA,
funds were to be withheld only for the actual performance of abortions. Id. at 650-51.
Planned Parenthood argued that the clause violated its First Amendment right of freedom
of expression. See id.
104. Id. at 651.
105. Id. at 656.
106. Id.
107. Id. (stating that simply calling the Standard Clause in question "foreign policy"
does not make it an expression of foreign policy).
108. 948 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1991).
109. U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof").
110. See Lamont, 948 F.2d at 827-28 (explaining that the American Schools and
Hospitals Abroad program allows AID to furnish assistance to foreign schools "serving as
study and demonstration centers for ideas and practicesof the United States").
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expressly committed to another branch under the Constitution."' After
concluding that the Constitution did not expressly preclude judicial
involvement, ' 2 the court evaluated whether the plaintiffs were

challenging the wisdom of the underlying policy of promoting the study
of the United States in religiously affiliated foreign schools or AID's
administration of that policy. 1 3 Relying upon Planned Parenthood, the

court held that the plaintiffs were challenging AID's method of
administering the policy of promoting foreign schools with federal funds
in violation of the First Amendment and thus presented a justiciable
issue."" According to the Second Circuit, the minimal invasion into the
area of foreign relations did not make this claim a nonjusticiable political
question.'5
In Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro,1l ' the Second Circuit was
presented with multiple lawsuits brought against the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO) as the result of its alleged terrorist
activities that caused the death of an American man." 7 In upholding the
district court's denial of the PLO's motion to dismiss on political
question grounds, the Second Circuit reasoned that the complaint

presented a justiciable issue." 8 Because the claim was an ordinary tort
suit, the court decided that it could decide the claim without
20
9'
compromising U.S. foreign policy." Similarly, in Kadic v. Karazdic,'

111. Id. at 832 (examining caselaw to determine whether the administration of foreign
aid to foreign schools was committed to the Executive Branch); see also Klinghoffer v.
S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that the dominant
consideration of the court in determining a political question is whether the claim is
textually committed to another branch).
112. See Lamont, 948 F.2d at 832 (finding that managing of foreign aid to foreign
schools was not textually committed to the Executive Branch after evaluating caselaw
interpreting the Constitution).
113. See id. at 832; but cf. Dickson v. Ford, 521 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that
an Establishment Clause suit against the U.S. government challenging funding of Israel's
military was a nonjusticiable political question because the foreign policy itself was being
questioned).
114. See Lamont, 948 F.2d at 832 (applying the Establishment Clause jurisprudence
after the court compared its factual situation with that in Planned Parenthood). See also
Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 838 F.2d 649, 656 (2d Cir.
1988) (applying the policy versus implementation logic).
115. Id. at 834.
116. 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir, 1991).
117. Id. at 47. The PLO boarded and seized an Italian cruise ship, and during the
melee, killed a passenger on the ship. Id. at 47.
118. Id. at 49-50 (using the six factors outlined in Baker to determine whether the case
should be adjudicated by the court).
119. Id. at 49-50 (explaining that because the claim involves tort law, it is a proper case
and controversy for the court to consider); see also Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332,
333, 336 (11th Cir. 1992). In Linder, a Nicaraguan anti-government military group

1062

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 50:1045

the Second Circuit rejected a political question defense even though the
suit against a foreign military leader accused of war crimes potentially
implicated the conduct of U.S. foreign relations.' 2'
Rather than
dismissing the claim based on the potential of political implications, the
court decided that the claim could be adjudicated under the Alien Tort
Claims Act 22 without interfering with a policy determination of the U.S.
government. '
In both Klinghoffer and Kadic, the Second Circuit
determined that although these cases arose in a politically charged
context, the issues were not transformed into nonjusticiable political
questions.' 24 Therefore, when a claim involves a substantive area of law
or a violation of individual rights, courts generally reject challenges
based on the political question doctrine even when a claim involves
foreign relations.'25
D. DeterminingSuccessor State Liability in the Second Circuit
The issue of foreign state succession has traditionally been recognized
as a foreign policy prerogative of the Executive Branch.' 2 Courts rarely
involve themselves in such matters either because they do not have 'the
27
resources or judicial standards to adjudicate claims of state succession
tortured and killed an American citizen working in Nicaragua. See id. at 333. The court
held that because the amended complaint fell under Florida tort liability law, it did not
challenge American foreign policy nor did it require the court to make policy
determinations. Id. at 336-37.
120. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
121. Id. at 249 (noting that judicial involvement may not be proper in cases involving
foreign military leaders for alleged war crimes because issues such as these are usually left
in the hands of the foreign policy makers - i.e., the Executive Branch).
122. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
123. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249-50 (acknowledging that policy determinations by the
court are not necessary because universally recognized norms of international law provide
judicially manageable standards for suits under the Alien Tort Claims Act).
124. Id. at 249; Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991)
(acknowledging that although the PLO is involved, the case remains an ordinary tort suit).
125. See Flynn v. Schultz, 748 F.2d 1186, 1191 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that unless an
action involving foreign relations is based on a constitutional right, treaty or
administrative procedure, the claim will present a political question); Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d
at 49 (determining that the claim in the case could be decided with tort principles).
126. See Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890) ("Who is the sovereign, de
jure or de facto, of a territory is not a judicial but a political question the determination of
which binds the judges... of that government. This principle has always been upheld by
this court."). See also CARSTEN THOMAS EBENROTH & MATTHEW JAMES KEMNER, The
Enduring PoliticalNature of Questions of State Succession and Secession and the Quest for
Objective Standards, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 753, 768 (1996) (citing Guaranty Trust
Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 137-38 (1937)).
127. See EBENROTH & KEMNER, supra note 126, at 767 (determining that foreign
state succession is "completely outside the power of the courts"). One commentator
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or because of expressed commitments in the Constitution that favor the
Executive Branch.

28

Successor states arise from various events and

circumstances, including military conflict that force the dismemberment
of the former state, 129 or when the former state becomes obsolete and a
new state replaces it. 3 There is a significant difference, however,
between the succession of a state, which creates a discontinuity of

statehood, and the succession of a government, which leaves statehood
unaffected."'

Regardless of how a successor state is created, its

recognition
is considered to be wholly within the power of the Executive
32
Branch.
The principle case in the Second Circuit regarding the adjudication of

argues that the political question doctrine specifically prevents federal judges from
creating foreign policy. Bruce Fein, Judicial Drug-Trafficking Jam, THE RECORDER,
Aug. 7, 1991, at 4 ("The political question doctrine serves in part to save the nation and
humanity from visionary international relations schemes concocted by nafve federal
judges."). But cf Franck, supra note 4, at 7 ("Judges are much better suited than is
sometimes alleged to make decisions incidentally affecting foreign relations and national
security.").
128. See U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2-3 (granting the Executive Branch the power to
appoint ambassadors and to receive ambassadors from foreign nations). The Supreme
Court determined that these constitutional grants give the Executive exclusive authority to
recognize foreign states or governments. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398, 410-11 (1964).

129. See

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

at § 208, cmt. b (1987) (defining types of successor states, including a state wholly
absorbing another state, a state that becomes independent of another state of which it was
a part, and a new state that arises because of the dismemberment of the former state). See
also, PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 165-68 (7th rev. ed. 1997) (giving the examples of the Baltic States, the Soviet Union,
Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Germany and Yemen to describe state succession issues).
130. See EBENROTH & KEMNER, supra note 126, at 756 (noting that "'[s]tate
succession' is an amorphous term").
131. Id. at 756 ("State succession involves a complete discontinuity of statehood.").
See also Trans-Orient Marine Corp. v. Star Trading & Marine, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 619, 621
(S.D.N.Y. 1990), affd 925 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1991) (recognizing that the changing of the
Sudanese government did not create a new state, because a simple change in government
leaves statehood unaffected).
132. See EBENROTH & KEMNER, supra note 126, at 767; see also Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 212 (1962) (noting that after the Executive Branch determines that a territory
has a sovereign the courts can review whether a statute or treaty applies to the territory
but cannot review the Executive's policy determination). According to the Restatement
of Foreign Relations, the Executive Branch, rather than Congress or the courts, has the
exclusive authority to conduct or not to conduct diplomatic relations, and to recognize or
not to recognize a foreign state or government. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 204 (1997). Additionally, the President can
arrange international agreements involving the recognition of foreign governments
without authorization from Congress or consent of the Senate. United States v. Belmont,
301 U.S. 324, 326, 330-31 (1937).
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a state succession question is Can v. United States.' 33 In Can, nationals of

the former Republic of South Vietnam sued the United States in an
attempt to release the assets frozen by the U.S. government after the fall

of the South Vietnamese government to North Vietnam in 1975.'
Basing their argument on a political theory, the plaintiffs contended that
because South Vietnam was a "republican form of government," all the
assets of the former government essentially belonged to the South
Vietnamese people. 3 ' Although "cautiously invoked,"''36 the Second
Circuit ultimately decided that because the courts have no standards to
judge a claim of succession,' 37 the argument presented a nonjusticiable
political question. 38 The court declared that the Executive Branch was
in the best position to decide issues of state succession.'39 First, the court
determined that because Article II implicitly places the foreign relations
power in the Executive Branch,'40 it is the President's prerogative to
recognize any rights of succession." ' Additionally, the court decided
the decision
that if the former South Vietnamese citizens prevailed,
42
would, in effect, be creating national foreign policy.

133. 14 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Uhl, 137 F.2d 903, 906 (2d Cir.
1943) (stating that "[r]ecognition of foreign nations, it is settled, is a political question, the
determination of which by the legislative and executive departments if the government
conclusively binds the court.").
134. Can, 14 F.3d at 161-62.
135. Id. at 162 (explaining the plaintiff's contention that sovereignty belongs to the
people in a republican form of government).
136. Id. at 163 (recognizing that although the case may implicate foreign affairs, it
should not automatically be considered a political question); see also Planned Parenthood
Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 838 F.2d 649, 655-56 (2d Cir. 1988) (evaluating
the political question doctrine in reference to the particular facts).
137. Can, 14 F.3d at 163 (noting that the Executive Branch recognizes foreign
governments rather than the Judiciary).
138. Id. at 163-64 (using the Baker factors, the court determined that an initial policy
determination by the Executive Branch was required before the court could act).
139. Id. at 162-63 (declaring that the courts have no standards for succession claims
and the Executive Branch has been committed by the Constitution to determine
succession issues).
140. Id. at 163 (determining that sections two and three of Article II of the
Constitution give the Executive Branch the power over foreign relations).
141. Id. The court recognized the importance of succession policy making by the
President as an important tool in negotiations with foreign governments, and would not
want to upset this bargaining chip with an adverse judicial determination. Id.
142. Id. If the court granted the plaintiffs' relief and enabled them to take control of
the former South Vietnamese assets, then they would be disturbing a potential leveraging
tool of the United States in its relations with the current Vietnamese government. Id. See
also EBENROTH & KEMNER, supra note 126, at 768 (indicating that "Can reflects the long
standing precedent that the U.S. Judiciary will refuse to rule on what it views as an
exclusively political issue").
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Similar to the events in Southeast Asia, the disintegration of the SFRY
spawned numerous civil suits in the district courts of the Second Circuit
regarding the assets and liabilities of the former country. 4 3 Of these

cases, most were dismissed as raising nonjusticiable political questions
because in order for the court to adjudicate the claim, it had to determine
the issue of state succession. 4 ' Although the claims seemed to involve
substantive issues of law or questions of constitutional rights, 4 5 the
143. See 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. Consulate Gen. of Socialist Fed. Rep. of
Yugoslavia, 218 F.3d 152, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2000); see infra note 144 (discussing the former
SFRY suits).
144. See, e.g., Fed. Rep. of Yugoslavia v. Park-71st Corp., 913 F. Supp. 191, 194
(S.D.N.Y. 1995). In Park-71st Corp., an argument arose over who owned the property
previously occupied by the former SFRY's representative to the United Nations. Id. at
192. The court dismissed the case because FRY's argument that it was the successor of the
SFRY was considered a policy question for the Executive Branch to decide. Id. at 193-94
(following precedent from Can to avoid the encroachment upon the Executive's
prerogative).
Second Circuit courts have also considered and dismissed multiple lawsuits
involving the ownership of loans extended from banks in the former SFRY. See Yucyco,
Ltd. v. Rep. of Slovenia, 984 F. Supp. 209, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Beogradska Banka A.D.
Belgrade v. Interenergo Inc., No. 97 CIV. 2065, 1998 WL 661481, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
24, 1998); Jugobanka v. Sidex Int'l Furniture Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 407, 409 (S.D.N.Y.
1998). In Yucyco, for instance, a Cyprian bank sued the former Yugoslavian Republic of
Slovenia to recover loans made to the government of Slovenia and Slovenian controlled
banks. See Yucyco, 984 F. Supp. 209, 212. Yucyco, Ltd. argued that the Republic is liable
for an "equitable" share of the SFRY's obligations under a debt restructuring guaranty.
[d. at 218. Because the court would have been forced to make a decision on the
proportion of Yugoslavian debt that Slovenia was responsible for, it decided that the issue
was political and nonjusticiable. Id. at 219 (recognizing that "the settlement of foreign
debts falls squarely within the ambit of the President's and Congress' constitutional
authority"). Similarly, in Beogradska Banka v. Interenergo, Inc., a bank organized in the
FRY sought to collect debts owed by a Bosnian corporation. See Beogradska, 1998 WL
66148, at *3. The defendant argued that there was a succession issue, which raised a
political question, whereas the plaintiff argued that the case involved a simple debt
collection issue. Id. at *5-6. Because the plaintiffs legal claim to the banks of the former
SFRY, and consequently their loans was disputed as a matter of facts, the court refused to
dismiss the case without eliciting facts at trial. Id. at *10.
Moreover, in Jugobanka, a bank incorporated in FRY, which was the reputed
successor of two banks incorporated under the laws of the former SFRY, sued a
corporation to recover the balance on loans extended by the two former banks. See
Jugobanka,2 F. Supp. 2d at 409. The court held that the bank's claims were nonjusticiable
political questions because in order for the bank to prevail it had to establish that it
succeeded to the property of the former SFRY banks. Id. at 416. Based on the precedent
developed in Can, the court determined that it could not properly decide the issue of state
succession without encroaching upon the duties of the political branches. Id. at 415-17.
145. See Jugobanka,2 F. Supp. 2d at 409 (describing the plaintiff's claim that the case
involved a simple debt collection matter); Beogradska, 1998 WL 661481, at *2-3
(explaining the plaintiff's effort to collect debts owed to a FRY bank); Yucyco, 984 F.
Supp. at 212 (noting that the claim sought to recover loans made to the Republic of
Slovenia and Slovenian -controlled banks).
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courts dismissed these
suits because of the policy determinations raised
46
by state succession.

Nevertheless, the courts did not dismiss all of the cases resulting from
the demise of the SFRY as nonjusticiable. For instance, in Sage Realty
Corp. v. Jugobanka, D.D.,' 47 the Southern District of New York
adjudicated a claim to recover overdue rent involving a former
Yugoslavian bank.' 48 The Yugoslavian bank argued that the doctrine of
commercial frustration 149 excused the performance of the lease, thus
excusing their payment of the rent.'50 However, the Southern District of
New York rejected this argument because it was reasonable for the bank
to foresee the U.S. government's imposition of sanctions against
Yugoslavia.' 5' In making this determination, the court did not address
any issues concerning the sovereignty or succession of the former SFRY
republics.'52 Thus, the court could fully adjudicate the case 3because there
were no issues of succession or other foreign policy issues.1
II. 767 THIRD AVENUE ASSOCIATES:

DECIDING NOTTO DECIDE AN
ISSUE OF FOREIGN POLICY

In concluding that the recognition of a foreign state and its successors
is a non-justiciable political question, the Second Circuit acknowledged
that the determination of successor state liability for the former SFRY is

146. See Jugobanka, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 415 (recognizing that the political question
doctrine requires the court to dismiss the claim). See, e.g., Beogradska, 1998 WL 661481,
at *10 (dismissing the claim because of political question grounds once certain facts are
proven at trial); Yucyco, 984 F. Supp. at 219 (dismissing the claim because of the political
question doctrine).
147. No. 95 Civ. 0323,1998 WL 702272, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 1998).
148. Id. at *3-4 (treating the case as a simple contract action, which led the court to
reject the defendant's argument of contract frustration because of the foreseeability of
sanctions).
149. Black's Law Dictionary defines "commercial frustration in contracts" as the
"doctrine that, if the entire performance of a contract becomes fundamentally changed
without any fault by either party, the contract is considered terminated." See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 679 (7th ed. 1999).
150. See Sage Realty, 1998 WL 702272, at *2 (explaining the defendant's commercial
frustration claim that the imposition of sanctions against FRY was not foreseeable).
Failure on the part of the bank to foresee U.S. sanctions would have ultimately led to the
frustration of the contract. See id. at *3-4.
151. Id. at *3 (acknowledging that the Deputy General Manager if the bank knew of
the situation in FRY).
152. Id. at *3-4 (deciding the case without facing succession issues). Additionally, the
court denied Jugobanka's political question defense. Id. at *5 n.6.
153. Id. at *1-4 (treating the case as a simple contract matter rather than as a
succession issue).
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properly allocated to the Executive Branch,'5 4 and that a judicial

conclusion regarding the situation could hinder executive foreign
policy.155 In addition, the Second Circuit concluded that a claim
involving a political question
should be dismissed rather than placed on
56
the suspense calendar.
A. Turmoil in the Balkans

Between 1991 and 1995, a bloody ethnic war consumed the SFRY,
which resulted in the disintegration of the Balkan country into separate
sovereign states.157 The United States government, which opposed the

regime controlling the remnants of the former SFRY, blocked all
Yugoslavian assets 5 8 and forced all of the SFRY's consulate staff out of

the United States.15' Formally acknowledging that the SFRY ceased to
154. See 767 Third Ave. Assoc. v. Consulate Gen. of Socialist Fed. Rep. of Yugoslavia,
218 F.3d 152, 160, 163 (2d Cir. 2000) (concluding that constitutional jurisprudence
prohibits the Judiciary from usurping the Executive Branch's power to recognize foreign
states). See also Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (holding that the
conduct of foreign relations is committed to the other two branches); Can v. United States,
14 F.3d 160, 164 (1994) (holding that state succession is constitutionally committed to the
Executive).
155. See 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 218 F.3d at 160 (agreeing with the government's
amicus brief that the U.S. government is looking towards international forums to resolve
the liability question due to the volatile atmosphere in the area of the former SFRY).
156. Id. at 163-64 (believing that dismissal is more appropriate. than a stay order). The
Second Circuit decided that the lower court was incapable of adjudicating the issue
because there was no policy determination made within a reasonable time, thus
eliminating the reason for the stay order. Id. at 163.
157. See Jugobanka, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 409 (indicating that "ethnic, religious, and
nationalistic rivalries" stemming from the government's collapse caused the subsequent
civil war); see also 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1575, 1577 (Fed. Cl.
1995) (discussing the history of the Yugoslav breakup in this action by the landlords
alleging an illegal taking by the United States government).
The aggression of the state of Serbia propelled each individual Yugoslavian state
to declare independence. See Yucyco, Ltd. v. Rep. of Slovenia, 984 F. Supp. 209, 212-13
(S.D.N.Y. 1997). After declaring their independence in 1991, Croatia and Slovenia faced a
conflict with the highly nationalistic Serb minorities and the Serbian-controlled
Yugoslavian armies. See U.S. Department of State, BOSNIA FACT SHEET: CHRONOLOGY
OF THE BALKAN CONFLICT, available at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/

balkan conflictchron.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2001) [hereinafter Bosnia Fact Sheet].
Additionally, when Bosnia declared independence in 1992, the Bosnian Serbs resisted the
independence movement. See id. The Serb resistance to the Yugoslavian breakup led to
the protracted conflict. See id.
158. 767 Third Ave. Assoc., 218 F.3d at 156. Due to the threat to the national security
of the United States, executive orders by the President froze Yugoslavian property within
the United States and blocked all Yugoslavian assets in the United States. Id.
159. Id. at 157. Specifically, the U.S. government ordered that all SFRY offices close
immediately, terminate operations by May 31, 1992, and have all staff leave the country by
the first week of June 1992. See id.; Exec. Order No. 12,808, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,299 (May 30,
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exist on May 24, 1992,160 the United States also formally recognized the
independent sovereign states of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia between 1992 and
1994.161 In an attempt to resolve the succession issue, the Republics of
Serbia and Montenegro declared themselves the continuation and sole
successors of the SFRY by forming the FRY on April 27, 1992.162
Despite its declaration of succession, neither the United States, the
United Nations nor the European Union recognized the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) as the continuation to the SFRY. 1' 3 In
1995, the United States negotiated the Dayton Accords with the FRY
64
and the other successor states in order to end the ethnic war.
Simultaneously,
the Dayton Accords established
a Peace
65
Implementation Council, in part, to resolve succession issues.
Resolution of succession issues remain elusive, however, as negotiations
1 66
continue to this day.

B. The Second Circuit: Extending PoliticalQuestion Jurisprudenceto the
Detrimentof the Innocent Landlords
In 767 Third Avenue Associates v. Consulate General of Socialist
FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia, 16 owners of property in New York City
claimed that three agencies of the former SFRY breached the lease
extensions signed in 1991, which resulted in overdue rent totaling
$2,262,224 plus interest.68 Not only did the landlords sue the specific
1992) (declaring a national emergency to deal with the threat to national security, foreign
policy and the economy, and ordering "all property and interests in the property in the
name of the Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or the
government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that are in the United States... are
hearby blocked"); Exec. Order No. 12,810, 57 Fed. Reg. 24,347 (June 5, 1992) (expanding
the aforementioned sanctions to all Yugoslavian assets within the United States).
160. 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 218 F.3d at 156.
161. Id. Additionally, the United Nations admitted Slovenia, Croatia and BosniaHerzegovina in 1992, with Macedonia being admitted in 1993. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. (stating that neither the United States nor the European Union would
recognize the FRY). Moreover, the United Nations denied the FRY's request to
automatically succeed to the SFRY's membership in the United Nations. See 31 I.L.M.
1427, 1454 (1992).
164. 767 Third Ave. Assoc., 218 F.3d at 156. The Dayton Accords were the
culmination of the peace effort to mark the end of the armed conflict in Bosnia. See
Bosnia Fact Sheet, supra note 157. This United States-led mediation established the basic
principles of a settlement as well as a cease-fire. Id.
165. 767 ThirdAve. Assoc., 218 F.3d at 156.
166. Id.
167. 218 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2000).
168. See 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. Consulate Gen. of Socialist Fed. Rep. of
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SFRY tenants, they also included the five successor states in the suit to

recover the rent. 6 9 In asserting a Statement of Interest in the case, the
United States Department of State admitted that the successor states
have interests in the liabilities of the former SFRY, but explained that
the Administration had not yet determined what those interests were170
because it was deferring to international negotiations to produce a
determination.' 7 ' Regardless of the outcome of these negotiations, the
United States argued that the Constitution delegates the issue72 of
successor liability to the Executive Branch rather than the Judiciary. 1
After analyzing the issues, 73 the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York determined that the action presented a
nonjusticiable political question. 174 Applying the six factors presented in
Baker,17 5 the court determined that the separation of powers doctrine
and the risk of inconsistent allocation issues precluded adjudication of
the matter.176 Noting the constitutional textual commitment to the
Executive Branch in the area of state recognition,'77 the court reasoned
Yugoslavia, 60 F. Supp. 2d 267,269-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
169. Id. at 270 (describing the plaintiff's claim that "the five state defendants are
successors to the SFRY's liabilities as sovereign states that formerly were part of, and that
together constitute the whole of, the SFRY").
170. Id. at 271.
171. Id. To help maintain peace in the Balkans, the U.S. government wished to let
international agreements determine the successor's liability rather than have the U.S.
government determine liability. See id.
172. See id. The court considered the Executive's policy, but it was not conclusive for
the court's determination. See id. at 274.
173. See id. at 277-82. The Second Circuit considered the District Court's opinion "an
extensive and thorough" one. 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. Consulate Gen. of Socialist Fed.
Rep. of Yugoslavia, 218 F.3d 152, 157 (2d Cir. 2000).
174. See 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 60 F. Supp. 2d at 282 (reasoning that a suspension is
necessary until the Executive Branch determines liability). The opinion began with the
recognition of Second Circuit precedent "that successorship is the classic sort of political
question that the courts cannot decide." See id. at 272 (quoting Can v. United States, 14
F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that "courts have no standards for judging a claim of
succession to a former sovereign... "). The court concluded that the successorship issues
would also present practical problems for the Judiciary. See 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 60 F.
Supp. 2d at 273-74 (recognizing that issues, such as whether each of the successor states
actually used the tenant's offices, were not clear). Additionally, the court rejected the
request of the U.S. government that the five newly created states be dismissed as parties to
the suit and limit the action to the SFRY. See id. at 274 (noting that protecting the interest
of the government in avoiding all successor liability issues would preclude adjudicating any
liability).
175. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text (discussing the factors proposes in
Baker to define a political question).
176. See 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 60 F. Supp. 2d at 274-75.
177. See id. (citing Can in determining that only the Executive Branch has authority to
recognize a foreign government).
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that any determination of the successor liability would create a situation
detrimental to the foreign policy position of the Clinton Administration,
which was to allow international agreements to determine the issue of
liability. 78 Additionally, the concerns of inconsistency raised by the fifth
and sixth Baker factors 7 9 could arise if the Judiciary and the Executive
answered the allocation question in two different ways, thus allowing the
court to encroach upon the Executive's power to make foreign policy. 8 °
After concluding that the issue of liability presented a political question,
the court placed the action on the suspense calendar, to await executive
determination of the liability allocation for the Yugoslavian successor
states.' 8'
The Second Circuit considered 767 Third Avenue Associates on appeal
after ruling that the lower court's stay effectively prohibited the
landlords from resolving the issue of liability for the overdue rent. 2
After agreeing with the district court that the factors outlined in Baker
applied to this case,' the Second Circuit ruled that the issues raised
presented a nonjusticiable political question because the area of foreign
relations is constitutionally committed to the Executive Branch,'84 and
178. See id. (concluding that a judicial determination of liability would violate the
separation of powers doctrine because such a foreign policy issue is committed to the
Executive Branch).
179. See supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
180. See 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 60 F. Supp. 2d at 274-75. Also, the court worried that
inconsistencies could result if each district court developed its own liability distribution
formula for the former SFRY states. Id. at 275. The court concluded that only the U.S
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has the authority to prevent inconsistent foreign
affairs pronouncements within the Second Circuit. Id.
181. Id at 282 (allowing the landlords to wait for a decision of the Executive). The
landlords also presented theories of allocation of liability for the SFRY by either using the
distribution scheme presented by the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") or using basic
joint and several liability jurisprudence. Id. at 276. However, the court did not think that
either solution escaped the political question doctrine. Id. at 276-77 (recognizing that the
Executive Branch's policy conflicts with the IMF's and the joint and several liability law's
theories of allocation). The district court concluded that once the Executive Branch
formulates a policy on the succession issue, the court may properly adjudicate the case. Id.
at 277-79 (ordering a stay on the case). The question of whether the case was properly
placed on the suspense calendar is not examined in this Note.
182. See 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 218 F.3d at 159. The court followed the Supreme
Court's ruling that an "abstention-based stay order was appealable as a 'final decision'
because it put the landlords out of court. Id. (quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
517 U.S. 706, 713 (1996)). The Second Circuit decided that whenever a plaintiff loses
because the claim presents a political question, the case should be dismissed rather than
suspended. 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 218 F.3d at 163-64. Although the procedural posture
of the case may itself be a question for review, this Note does not focus on the applicability
of the landlord's appeal.
183. Id. at 160.
184. Id. at 160-61 (relying on the precedents of Baker and Can the court decided that
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because there are no judicially manageable standards for determining the
issues presented.18 5
The Second Circuit first decided that the issue of foreign state
succession is an area reserved for executive control.186 The court noted
that the Supreme Court declared that the conduct of foreign relations is
committed to the political branches, 187 and that decisions in this area are
generally not subject to judicial inquiry. 88 The Second Circuit also noted
its previous determination 8 9 that the recognition of a foreign sovereign is
a traditional area of foreign policy reserved for the Executive. 9 ° The
court pointed to the politically charged atmosphere that continued to
exist in the Balkans to explain why it would not interfere with a foreign

policy still in development. 191

Next, the court determined that the legal relief sought by the landlords
did not have judicially discoverable or manageable standards.'9 2 The
court rejected the landlords' argument that tort principles could be used
to adjudicate the issue of liability because the court determined that such
common law principles have no basis in international law. 93 Moreover,
the court found that international law did not support the claim of
liability against the successor states. 194 In support of this conclusion, the
court turned to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, 95 which suggests that successor states do not succeed
to
96
previous state debt without a specific agreement to the contrary. 1
foreign policy issues like state succession are reserved for the Executive's discretion).
185. Id. at 161-62 (recognizing that standards to determine state succession and relief
are nonexistent).
186. Id. at 160.
187. Id. (citing Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 298 (1918)).
188. See id. (discussing the conclusion of the Court in Oetjen that the Constitution
commits the power of conducting foreign relations to the Executive and Legislative
Branches).
189. Id. (citing Can v. United States, 14 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 1994)).
190. See id. (concluding that the precedents of Can and Oetjen "squarely apply here").
191. Id. (deferring to the Executive Branch in allowing international agreements to
shape foreign policy, as well as fearing that a judicial determination would hinder the

international process).
192. Id. at 161 (stating that the district court "relied primarily" on the second Baker

factor).
193. Id. at 161 (citing First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de
Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 622 n.11 (1983) (holding that international law rather than state law

governs liability allocation among foreign states)).
194. Id. (stating that the landlords' argument that international law automatically
makes the successor states liable is not true).
195. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 209(2).
196. 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 218 F.3d at 161 (finding no agreements between the
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The final argument raised by the landlords to support their contention
of justiciability was that the district court granted jurisdiction,'9 7 and
therefore the appellate court had the capability to decide the issues
before it.' 98 The court rejected this argument because the jurisdictional
issues were completely distinguishable from the non-justiciability issues
in a suit assessing the liability of a foreign state.' 99 Using the Baker
factors to define a nonjusticiable political question 20 °' as well as the
holding in Can that determining successor liability is reserved for the
Executive,2 °' the Second Circuit agreed with the lower court's opinion
that the issue of Yugoslavian liabilities was a non-justiciable political
question. °2 Consequently, the court remanded the case to the district
court to be dismissed.20 3
III. REFUSING TO ADJUDICATE A CHALLENGE TO U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY: 767 THIRD AVENUEASSocIATES CONTINUES TO DEFER STATE
SUCCESSION ISSUES TO THE EXECUTIVE

A. Rejecting a Challenge to U.S. ForeignPolicy
By refusing to adjudicate the question of the liability of the former
SFRY and its successor states, the Second Circuit in 767 Third Avenue
Associates implicitly acknowledged the difference between challenging
U.S. foreign policy and challenging the implementation of that policy,
which often involves substantive issues of law or the infringement of
former SFRY and the present states). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 210(3). Successor states do not automatically
succeed to the predecessor's debt simply by being a successor state. See Yucyco, Ltd. v.
Rep. of Slovenia, 984 F. Supp. 209, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (using international law principles
to determine that a successor state is not bound by the precedent's agreements).
197. 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 218 F.3d at 162; Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1994) ("FSIA") (allowing suits against foreign states or nationals by
eliminating sovereign immunity in certain circumstances, such as the "commercial entity"
exception).
198. 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 218 F.3d at 162. The landlords' claim was not raised in
the district court, and the Court of Appeals quickly dismissed it because it would not
consider an argument raised for the first time on appeal. Id.
199. Id. at 162-63 (explaining that the sections cited of the FSIA are not relevant to the
justiciability of the landlord's claims).
200. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text (discussing the Baker factors).
201. Can v. United States, 14 F.3d 160, 162-63 (2d Cir. 1994) (recognizing the lack of
judicial standards to determine succession claims).
202. 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 218 F.3d at 160 (agreeing "with the district court that
virtually all of the Baker v. Carrfactors apply to this case").
203. Id. at 164. The Second Circuit reviewed the district court's decision to stay the
case and decided that political question cases should be dismissed rather than placed on
the suspense calendar. Id.
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constitutional rights. 4 Consistent with forty years of political question
jurisprudence," 5 the 767 Third Avenue Associates decision continues to
uphold the separation of powers doctrine by refusing to adjudicate a
policy issue reserved for Executive Branch action, 206 namely the issue of
foreign state succession.0 7 In refusing to adjudicate a foreign policy
matter, the Second Circuit relied on the Constitution's textual
commitment to the Executive Branch in establishing national foreign
policy. 2 8

The court also conceded the lack of judicially manageable

standards for resolving issues of liability of former sovereign states and
201
Moreover, the Second Circuit used Supreme Court
their successors.
2
jurisprudence, as well as its own precedent, to conclude that questions
of foreign state succession are best determined by the Executive Branch
rather than the Judiciary.2 ' Consequently, the issue of liability in
matters concerning former and successor states is determined to be a
nonjusticiable political question because it would require a court to make
204. Id. at 160-62 (recognizing that determining the succession issues of the SFRY
require a determination of policy). See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v.
Agency for Int'l Dev., 838 F.2d 649, 650-51 (2d Cir. 1988) (allowing a challenge on the
implementation of U.S. policy); but cf Flynn v. Schultz, 748 F.2d 1186, 1199 (7th Cir. 1984)
(refusing to allow a challenge of the actual U.S. policy towards a foreign government
because the judicial determination may harm U.S. policy).
205. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,210-11 (1962) (stating that "[t]he nonjusticiability
of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers").
206. 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 218 F.3d at 160 (finding that virtually all of the Baker
factors apply in this case).
207. Baker,369 U.S. at 212 (noting that under the Constitution, the Executive Branch
recognizes foreign states); see also Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890)
(determining that the recognition of a foreign sovereign is a political question reserved for
the executive and legislative bodies).
208. 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 218 F.3d at 160 (analyzing the allocation of powers to the
three branches under the Constitution); see discussion supra Part I.A.
209. 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 218 F.3d at 161 (stating that there are no standards for
state succession); see discussion supra Part I.D. It could be argued, however, that the
international conventions on state succession would give the Judiciary standards to
determine these issues. See United States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 131 n.10 (1st Cir.
1997) (consulting the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties
when addressing a state succession issue and stating that "the Convention is nonetheless
viewed as an authoritative statement of the rule governing the succession of states under
public international law").
210. See discussion supra Part I.A. The Second Circuit, as well as the district court,
primarily relied on the Baker decision. 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 218 F.3d at 160.
211. 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 218 F.3d at 160 (relying on Can to adjudicate the issue of
foreign succession rights); see discussion supra Part II.B. Additionally, although Professor
Franck disagrees with judicial adherence to the political question doctrine, he states that
"[o]nly the State Department recognizes governments or withholds recognition." Franck,
supra note 4, at 6. Thus, Professor Franck may agree with the 767 Third Avenue
Associates outcome, because the court's holding results in allowing only the State
Department to recognize the successors to the FRY, not the Second Circuit.
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a foreign policy determination normally afforded to the Executive
Branch." 2
Attacking the implementation of foreign policy or the substantive right
of an individual that has foreign policy implications may not involve a
political question.1 3 However, attacking the prudence of a particular
policy will likely trigger the political question doctrine. 1 4 Accordingly,
the court in 767 Third Avenue Associates looked closely at the facts and
how the claim was presented to determine if the claim implicating foreign
relations involved a political question."1 5
The landlords' claim in 767 Third Avenue Associates presented what
212. 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 218 F.3d at 160-62 (refusing to adjudicate a succession

issue); see discussion supra Part I.D. By focusing on whether the issue presented in 767
Third Avenue Associates involved a political question and whether there are judicial
standards to adjudicate a question of liability, the Second Circuit concerned itself with its
obligation to uphold the proper position of the branches in the Constitution's separation
of powers scheme. Id. at 159-62 (applying only two of Baker's six factors, even though the
court agreed with the district court that all of the factors apply to the issue); see also
Baker, 369 U.S. at 210 (stating that the function of the political question doctrine is one of
separation of powers). In recognizing the Executive's responsibility to make foreign
policy, the court deferred to the Executive Branch the responsibility of resolving questions
of foreign state succession. 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 218 F.3d at 160 (using the precedent of
Can to hold that the succession issue was one for the Executive to make the primary
interpretation). Similarly, because there lacked any judicially discoverable or manageable
standards for the court to utilize in adjudicating issues of liability concerning former and
newly created foreign countries, the court acquiesced that the dispute involved a
nonjusticiable political question. Id. at 161 (determining that the landlords did not present
any theories of which the court could use to resolve the issue); see also Nixon v. United
States, 506 U.S. 224, 228-29 (1993) (looking at whether an issue presents a political
question, the Supreme Court stated "the lack of judicially manageable standards may
strengthen the conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a
coordinate branch"). In refusing to change its view that the Executive should make
decisions that concern state succession, the court extended the use of the Baker factors
when reviewing a potential political question. Id. at 160-61 (placing, along with the district
court, much emphasis on Baker and Can). The court also continued the tradition of
having the Executive decide important foreign policy matters, such as determining the
liability of a former country and its successors for torts committed against U.S. citizens.
Id at 160.
213. See Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 843 (2d Cir. 1991) (challenging the use of
foreign aid rather than the wisdom behind it, the plaintiffs presented a judicially
reviewable action); see supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text (discussing a claim
adjudicated under the Alien Tort Claims Act that did not interfere with a policy
determination of the U.S. goverment).
214. See Can, 14 F.3d at 164 (dismissing an action by Vietnamese nationals who sought
to attack the United States' policy regarding foreign succession issues); Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (noting that the Court must refuse to decide any issue
that "involves a challenge to the conduct of diplomatic and foreign affairs for which the
President is exclusively responsible").
215. 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 218 F.3d at 160; Baker, 369 U.S. at 211 (noting that the
court must look at the claim itself when determining political questions).
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Yet, the landlords

ultimately asked the court to make a policy determination of successor
state liability, which in effect challenged the United States policy

regarding the SFRY.217 By requiring the court to allocate the liability of
the successor states to the SFRY, the landlords challenged the
underlying policy of the United States, which was to allow international
negotiations decide the succession issue.2" 8 Inevitably, if the landlords

wish to challenge the implementation of the United States' policy
regarding successor state liability, they will have to wait until the
Executive Branch acts in order to avoid the nonjusticiable political
question.219
Additionally, although the courts of the Second Circuit are not
permitted to make foreign policy determinations, they do have the
opportunity to adjudicate claims based on substantive law that
collaterally push the claim into the foreign relations arena, and therefore
avoid political question determinations. 220
If landlord-tenant
jurisprudence could have been applied to the landlords' claim against the
SFRY in 767 Third Avenue Associates,' the court may have proceeded

in adjudicating the claim without having to make a foreign policy
determination, as it did in Klinghoffer, where the court used tort
jurisprudence to resolve the claim presented.222 Moreover, if the
landlords wait until the Executive makes a determination regarding the

liability of the successor states, then they may be able to challenge the
implementation or administration of such a policy as was done in

Lamont, where the court decided an issue involving foreign policy

216. 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 218 F.3d at 155 (stating that the case looked like a
"garden-variety landlord-tenant dispute").
217. Id. at 160-61 (recounting from the government's amicus brief that the current
policy of the U.S. government was to allow international negotiations determine the
SFRY liability issues).
218. Id. at 159-60. Making a determination of the successor states' liability required
the court to contradict or ignore the policy of the United States.
219. Id. at 160-61. Presumably, the landlords may be able to challenge the specific
proportions that the United States has agreed to allocate among the successors because
the courts have the power to examine the statutes and application of that policy. See
Baker, 369 U.S. at 212 (recognizing that once the Executive has made a decision regarding
the status of a foreign government, the courts may examine it).
220. See Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44,46 (2d Cir. 1991) (allowing
an action against terrorists to go forth); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1996)
(using federal tort law to decide the liability of a foreign military leader).
221. See 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 218 F.3d at 155 (noting that this was not a simple
landlord-tenant case).
222. Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 49.
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because it had the opportunity to use constitutional standards. 223 Yet,
the landlords' claim did more than just push the question presented into
the realm of foreign relations;224 the claim required the court to make an
initial determination of the successor states' liability, which it could not
have done under the political question doctrine without prior executive
action.225
B. Waiting for the Executive Branch: the Future of Suits Against the

Former SFRY, Its Successor States and the Implications On Other Volatile
Nations
The decision in 767 Third Avenue Associates has both positive and
negative consequences. Although a majority of the district courts in the

Second Circuit have essentially ruled that claims raising succession issues
against the former SFRY should be dismissed,2 6 the Second Circuit
solidified the opinion that any claim requiring the court to make a
determination of the foreign state succession issues will be dismissed as a
nonjusticiable political question.22 7 Now, in order to be adjudicated,

claims 228
against former or successor states will have to avoid questions of
policy.
Additionally, the Second Circuit reaffirmed the Executive's control
over conducting foreign relations, especially in the area of foreign state
succession."' By basing its opinion on the separation of powers principle
of textual commitments, the court upheld the view that the Executive
Branch is committed to making determinations of foreign state

223. Lamont, 948 F.2d at 832-33 (discussing the use of constitutional law to determine
the claim).
224. See Attorney Gen. of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, 103 F. Supp. 2d
134, 146 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (recognizing that simply because an issue may tangentially
involve the area of foreign relations does not necessarily mean that it is a nonjusticiable
political question).
225. 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 218 F.3d at 155-59 (implying that since the SFRY has
ceased to exist, the simple claim of overdue rent presents more than just a debt collection
case).
226. See, e.g., Yucyco, Ltd. v. Rep. of Slovenia, 984 F. Supp. 209, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
See also infra note 144.
227. 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 218 F.3d at 164 (requiring cases raising political questions
issues to be dismissed rather than placed on the suspense calendar). By deciding the
precise issue of whether state succession can be properly adjudicated, the Second Circuit
has pronounced controlling authority over its district courts as to this issue. Id.
228. See supra notes 212-214 (recognizing that challenging foreign policy will be
nonjusticiable, but challenging the implementation or substantive area of law will avoid
presenting a political question).
229. 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 218 F.3d at 160 (relying on Oetjen and Can to hold that
the Executive has the power to conduct foreign relations).
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succession and liability.230 As a result, the court adheres to the precedent
that an issue is a nonjusticiable political question when there is a textual
commitment to a coordinate branch of the government, in this case,
foreign state succession is a power committed to the Executive Branch."'
Although a legally sound opinion, the outcome was adverse to the
landlords who, through no fault of their own, lost the rent owed to them
pursuant to the leases.232 Moreover, this decision may prevent any action
being considered against former or successor states if a possible question
of succession arises.233
On a potentially larger scale, the Second Circuit's decision could
ultimately deter private individuals and corporations from engaging in
business dealings with politically volatile foreign countries. As a result of
the decision, U.S. investors and businesses may shy away from
contracting with foreign governments in countries that have the potential
of dissolving because of the fear that these countries will not be liable to
pay for their obligations.23 4 In such a situation, a party will not be able to
230. Id. at 160 (noting that the precedents of Oetjen and Can "squarely apply here").
231. The first Baker factor, textual commitment, is considered the most dominant of
the six. See Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44,49 (2d Cir. 1991); Lamont v.
Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 831 (2d Cir. 1991). More importantly, the issue of state succession is
considered committed to the Executive. See Can v. United States, 14 F.3d 160, 163 (2d
Cir. 1994).
232. The court correctly applied political question jurisprudence but to the detriment
of the landlords. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (proposing six factors to establish a
nonjusticiable political question). However, it may be argued that the landlords did
assume the business risk because they signed the new leases at the time when the former
Yugoslavia was in political upheaval. 767 ThirdAve. Assocs., 60 F. Supp. 2d at 278 (noting
that the landlords should have anticipated the risk of rent issues because of the unstable
climate in the former SFRY). The district court stated that the landlords' foreseeability of
the political turmoil does not insulate the defendants from liability, but it does lessen the
inequity involved for the landlords. Id. at 278.
233. 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 218 F.3d at 161-62. The Second Circuit's decision
essentially stated that the claim will be a nonjusticiable political question if it involves a
determination of foreign successor state liability. Id.
234. For example, the Republic of Cyprus contains two distinct ethnic groups (Greek
and Turkish) that refuse to unite as a single nation. See U.S. Department of State,
http://www.state.gov/www/
available at
Cyprus,
on
Notes
Background
backgroundnotes/cyprus_9810_bgn.htmi (last visited Nov. 17, 2000) ("There is little
movement of people and essentially no movement of goods or services between the two
parts of the island. Efforts to reunite the island under a federal structure continue,
however, under the auspices of the United Nations."). The possibility of internal war has
kept the United Nations Peacekeepers on the island since 1964. See id. In addition, the
United States has been a top supplier of exports to Cyprus in recent years - exporting
$460.5 million worth of goods to have a 12.5 percent share of Cyprus' import market in
1998. See U.S. Department of State, FY 2000 Country Commercial Guide: Cyprus,
http://www.state.gov/www/about-state/business/com-guides/2000/
at
available
europe/cyprusCCG2000.pdf (last visited July 15, 2001). Because the Cyprian government
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assert liability against the country in litigation unless the succession issue
is undisputed. 3 ' Significantly, plaintiffs seeking to bring an action
against a country that has disintegrated will have to wait until the
Executive
Branch makes a policy determination regarding that nation's
236
liability.
IV. CONCLUSION

In determining that issues of liability in matters affected by foreign
state succession must be resolved by the Executive Branch rather than
the Judiciary, the Second Circuit properly utilized the political question
doctrine to defend the constitutional system of separated powers.
Because of the political question doctrine, the power to conduct foreign
relations remains firmly entrenched within the Executive Branch, as seen
in 767 Third Avenue Associates. Therefore; when a claim challenges the
foreign policy of the United States rather than the implementation of
that policy, a court will likely hold that the issue presents a nonjusticiable
political question because the Executive Branch has the power to
conduct foreign relations and the Judiciary lacks applicable standards to
adjudicate claims involving foreign policy. Consequently, the necessary
has a very large role in the economy, U.S. companies may very well contract with the
government itself. See id. ("Substantial assets remain in government hands in the form of
Semi-Government Organizations, such as the Cyprus Telecommunications Authority, the
Electricity Authority of Cyprus, etc."). Thus, the opportunity for a private contract with
the volatile Cyprus exists, which could be a liability if succession issues ever arise. See id.
Another state that may dissolve into two separate states is Sri Lanka, as "[t]he
Government of Sri Lanka is currently fighting Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
insurgents, who seek to create a separate state in the North and East." U.S. Department
of State, FY 2000 Country Commercial Guide: Sri Lanka, available at
http://www.state.gov/www/about-state/business/com-guides/2000/sa/srifanka-CCG2000.pd
f (last visited July 15, 2001). Resolution of the armed conflict does not seem likely in the
near future because the insurgents have no intention of ceasing their goal of a separate
state. See id. Much like Cyprus, U.S. exports to Sri Lanka have been significant in recent
years - with exported goods accounting for $190 million in 1998, $155 million in 1997 and
$211 million in 1996. See id. Likewise, the government of Sri Lanka has a large role in the
economy, but it is declining. See id. Therefore, if U.S. companies conduct business with
the government of Sri Lanka and the country disintegrates, the liability problems that
occurred in the Yugoslavian situation may happen again.
235. See Can, 14 F.3d at 163 (declaring that Vietnamese nationals cannot recover
frozen assets because the issue of state succession still exists).
236. 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 60 F. Supp. 2d at 278 (allowing the landlords to have their
action stayed until the Executive makes the policy determination). However, if the action
is brought prior to an executive determination regarding successor state liability, then the
action may be dismissed based on political question grounds. 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 218
F.3d at 164 (reversing the district court's decision to allow the landlords to wait by stating
that if an action presents a nonjusticiable political question, the proper decision is to
dismiss).
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evil of the political question protects the Executive's foreign policy
decisions by not allowing the Judiciary to judge the wisdom behind the
Executive Branch's policy.
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